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Abstract
Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in Africa. Recently a significant amount
of oil was discovered and production started in 2012. With a just distribution
of the income from natural resources it has the potential to significantly decrease
poverty. This thesis looks into patronage, which is an aspect of local institutions.
Patronage influences distribution in terms of allocation of development programs
in Madagascar. This thesis contributes to the literature in two aspects: firstly, by
measuring economic activity to identify patronage, secondly, by looking into whether
there is patronage in Madagascar over a longer period from 1992 to 2010.
The thesis uses satellite light data, measuring light density as a proxy for economic
activity. The method used is a difference in difference approach, using a relative
luminosity to analyze changes in trends of economic activity in each president’s
region relative to the whole country over time. The use of the difference in difference
approach allows controlling for factors that influence the whole country. Another
method used is a local analysis measuring changes in light density in the home towns
of the presidents when they enter and when they leave office.
The results suggest patronage towards nearly all home regions of the presidents
during the period. The identification of such a mechanism, that does not benefit
the poor in the country, prior to receiving massive incomes from oil production, will
contribute to an important debate about distributive mechanisms in Madagascar.
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1. Introduction
The motivation and context: Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in
Africa. The purpose of this thesis is to look into Patronage, which is one mech-
anism of distribution that affects poverty reduction in the country. Patronage is
that people in power prefer their own group in terms of distribution of power or
economic goods (Moser, 2008). Prevalence of patronage can be a sign of bad in-
stitutions. From the litterature (Mehlum et al., 2006) we know that the quality of
institutions is desicive for a country’s ability to exploit natural resources to increase
growth and potentially reduce poverty.
Oil has recently been discovered in Madagascar. The discovery of a natural resource
may lead the country to a brighter future and can potentially be a way out of
poverty. Mehlum et al. (2006) find that the counterintuitive is often observed in
countries with bad institutions.
Institutions is a wide term and represents broad aspects of a society. In the thesis
I look into patronage, which is one specific aspect of institutions. Patronage is
often given little attention in the research on economic growth and distribution.
The study of patronage is interesting because patronage might hinder effective use
of resources for further production and possibilities of growth. If the groups that
receive benefits due to patronage are not the same as the poor, patronage reduces
the chance of eradicating poverty. The identification of such a mechanism prior
to receiveing massive incomes from oil production, will contribute to an important
debate about redistributive mechanisms in Madagascar.
The hypothesis: My hypothesis is that there is patronage present at Madagascar
in the period of 1992-2010. Despite democratic reforms in many parts of Africa
many young democracies seem to retain characteristics of former neopatrimonial
regimes (Moser, 2008). This is also the case in Madagascar (Ødegård, 2011). Do
vestiges of past inefficient institutions persist long after democratization?. Recent
literature finds that this is the case in many African countries (Nunn, 2009). My
study is inspired by Moser (2010) and Moser (2008), who identify mechanisms of
patronage in allocation of development projects in Madagascar in 2001 and in 2007.
Moser uses survey data from these two years and exploits that there are two different
presidents in the two years. Moser also looks at allocation of public goods (2008) and
development projects (2010). My study contributes further on two aspects. Instead
of looking into only two years, I explore whether patronage exists over 20 years from
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1992-2010. Secondly, by using light density data I am able to do a broader study of
the overall economic activity in the whole country.
The results: The results of this thesis suggest patronage in Madagascar. The
results give indications that patronage is present as a living institution in Madagas-
car. The satellite night time light data suggest that all the presidents in the period
from 1992 to 2010, except the first democratic president after 17 years, favor their
home region or their group. I analyze the results and briefly discuss strengths and
weaknesses of the results and the use of night time satellite light as a proxy for
economic activity over time.
The data and method: To the extent of my knowledge, data on economic devel-
opment or economic activity over time on local levels in Madagascar is not available.
To overcome the lack of information, I explore the method of using night time satel-
lite light as a proxy for economic activity. This method has been used broadly in
the literature in the recent years. The night time light data is available from the
National Geophysical Data Center of the US National Oceanic and Athmospheric
Administration (NOAA) website. I also used maps on adminitrative areas from
DIVA-GIS, developed by Hijmans (2012). This data is based on physical measure-
ments from satellites, and is therefore unbiased by politics. The data is available for
the whole globe, and thus comparable between any region.
The analysis of the data is done with the software ArcGIS. To identify total light
density in an area I have aggregated the data in the different administrative levels
in the areas that have had a president. The tools used for aggregating the light
data are described in Appendix A. As the data covering the 20 years comes from
6 different satellites that measure slightly different, the data must be calibrated.
When exchanging a satellite the new satellite is nearly always used together with
the old for at least one year to allow comparison and calibration of data over time.
The reason for measuring differently is that the satellites get worned during the years
they run, and also no sensor measure exactly the same as another. Much effort is
put in the work on calibration and I explored three methods of data calibration and
use a fourth method based on an in house calibration key that the NOAA kindly
shared with me. All methods are described in the Appendix A.
I used two methods for identifying patronage. A relative luminosity analysis based
on a difference in difference approach analyses economic activity in a region relative
to the whole country over time. I also utilize local luminosity analysis that illustrates
the changes in economic activity in the presidents’ home towns when they enter and
leave office.
The structure of the thesis: The first chapter introduces the topic and gives an
overview of the thesis. In chapter 2, I give an introduction of the Malagasy context
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and particularly the political and economic environment when large oil reservoirs
are discovered. The chapter gives a short overview of Malagasy economics, politics,
environment, and petroleum law to prepare for the analysis in chapter 5. In the third
chapter I presents the institution of patronage and a former study of patronage in
Madagascar. Chapter 4 describes the night time satellite light data and the reason
for using this data. In chapter 5 I present the results and the analysis of the results.
The light data suggest patronage in most periods of my study. Finally, chapter 6
gives a brief discussion of the method and the results.
3
2. Context analysis of Madagascar
Political and Economic Background Situated in the Indian Ocean, on the east
coast of the African continent, Madagascar has for a long time been one of the poor-
est countries in the world. It is presently ranking 151 out of 187 countries in the
Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011) which, in addition to measures
income per capita, measures levels of education and levels of health and survival.
The country has also experienced a massive growth in population over the past two
decades. Data from the World Bank shows nearly a doubling from 12 million inhab-
itants in 1993 to 20.7 million inhabitants in 2011. The combination of population
growth and the widespread poverty in the country could lead to a pessimistic outlook
of the future. However, great natural wealth has been discovered. The local office
for national mines and strategic industries, OMNIS, has positive outlooks for the
economy of the country because of several discoveries of petroleum and gas. Explo-
ration blocks were sold in 2006 and several international companies are conducting
test drilling and have plans for production in the near future (OMNIS, 2012).
The island, as one of few countries, was a united, independent kingdom before it
became a French colony in 1896. Madagascar regained independence in 1960, but it
4
Context analysis of Madagascar
was not until the beginning of the 1990s that governmental power could be consid-
ered democratic. (Table 5.1 in chapter 5 gives an overview of the presidents since
the democratic processes started in the 1990s.) The social-Marxist Didier Ratsir-
aka governed without opposition from 1970-1991. During 1991-1993 the opposition
questioned Ratsiraka’s presidency and after several demonstrations and strikes the
17 years of single-party rule was ended by free Presidential and National Assembly
elections. Zafy Albert won the election and got the presidential seat in 1993. Dahl
(2008) writes that Zafy Albert represented a huge democratic change in the country.
One of his goals was to terminate Ratsirakas power. And with that also the patron-
age that had become an integrated part of the Malagasy socialism. Didier Ratsiraka
returned to power again in 1997. In 2001, the presidential election stood between
the followers of Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana. Didier Ratsiraka did
not want to loosen his grip onto power. He declared his home region Toamasina for
an independent state, nearly causing secession of half of the country. In April 2002,
the High Constitutional Court announced Ravalomanana the winner and after half
a year of disputes Ratsiraka fled the country for France. The former businessman
and entrepreneur Ravalomanana was a stable leader and considered a savior for the
economy. He liberalized the economy. His motto was to govern his country like
he governs an enterprise (Dahl, 2008 p.140). The country experienced a period of
economic growth when his policy was implemented. As the results from the satel-
lite lights indicate, the relative growth was largest in Antananarivo; the capital and
Mark Ravalomanana’s hometown. However, in 2008 he got accused of several cases
of corruption and Malagasy institutions were under pressure (Dahl, 2008).
The country is still in a phase of political instability after a coup d’ètat and the fol-
lowing non-democratic shift in presidency in early 2009. The accusations of former
president Marc Ravalomanana for corruption cost him the presidency. The young
mayor of the capital, Andry Rajoelina, played a role in the destabilized period and
the military appointed Andry Rajoelina as President of the High Transitional Au-
thority after the coup d’état in March 2009. Both the National Assembly and the
Senate were dissolved by the High Transitional Authority. SADC, the Southern
African Development Community, is facilitating political discussions between the
transitional president Andry Rajoelina and the three former presidents Marc Raval-
omanana, Zafy Albert and Didier Ratsiraka and their political groups. The aim
of the discussions is to agree upon new democratic elections in Madagascar and
whether all the former presidents can run for presidency. The discussions have led
to some common understanding called “the road map”. Despite of almost four years
of transitional government the road map is still under discussion and elections keep
being postponed (Dahl, 2012). Dahl (2011) writes that ex-president Zafy Albert
accuses France of directing the political crisis in Madagascar. He also accuses the
High Transitional Authority for deviating from the road map in favor of self-interest.
Zafy Alberts political group is therefore not willing to build new institutions in co-
operation with the transitional authorities. To do so would make them “become
slaves of the colonists and the leaders of the High Transitional Authority” (Dahl,
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2011). The crisis hit the economy, but also the institutions and not surprisingly the
score on institutional quality dropped dramatically in 2009 according to the “Polity
IV Country Report 2010: Madagascar”.
The political crisis has moved the country into greater poverty as income from
tourism and trade have been severely hit. Most international aid has also been
stopped or frozen as a result of the unsolved political situation, leaving the poor-
est to suffer even more. The inter-governmental organization “Southern African
Development Community” (SADC) and other regional and international organiza-
tions are facilitating negotiations suggesting to form a power-sharing government.
After being postponed several times, elections are now due in May 2013 (Tribune,
20.08.12). The political situation has led the country into a seemingly weightless
condition where everyone is waiting for each other and growth has stagnated. This
is in contrast to the recent period of growth where the export performance improved
in the first decade of this millennium. Between 1998 and 2007 export volumes grew
on average by 9 % a year, up from 5 % during the previous decade according to
IMF (Eyraud: 2009, p.4). The same report points out that the country’s economy
also has experienced several negative shocks. The political crisis in 2002, which
led to domestic inflation, as well as the termination on special agreement benefit-
ing textile products in 2005 and the increase in commodity prices in 2008 which
increased the production cost for exporters are shocks that have hurt the country’s
competitiveness, and therefore the whole economy.
A resource based development strategy will meet a number of challenges from a
macroeconomic perspective. The ministry of energy and mines, OMNIS and the
Directorate of good governance (2006) have proposed to establish a trust fund of
revenues from the petroleum. This can be compared to the Norwegian Pension fund.
OMNIS (Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Stratégiques) OMNIS
is state-owned, operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy and was
created in 1976. The organization is in charge of the legal framework for upstream oil
and gas activities in Madagascar. In addition to managing exploration data, doing
laboratory analysis of samples, and the acquisition of technical exploration data,
OMNIS is engaged in promoting petroleum activity and investment in Madagascar.
According to their website (29.08.12) OMNIS, based on its main activities, endeavors
to develop partnership with oil and mining companies. Their objectives are firstly to
create incentive and competitive environments for foreign investments, and secondly
to review and systematically update the exploration data to allow easy and reliable
prospect appraisal.
OMNIS divide the petroleum exploration history in Madagascar into three main
periods. The first period is from the French colonial period prior to 1960. Dur-
ing this period, exploration was conducted mainly by SPM, a subsidiary of ELF
Aquitaine (the French national oil society, today called Total). After independence
the first non-French international companies entered. Since the creation of OMNIS
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in 1976 Madagascar has established important partnership with major international
oil companies. Presently there are 75 exploration wells: one in onshore Ambilobe
Basin, 8 in Majunga Basin, 65 in Morondava Basin and one in offshore East Coast
(OMNIS, 2012).
Mineral Activity Prospects Madagascar’s oil reserves are significant according to
Madagascar Oil, one of the main oil companies operating in the country; a Bermuda
registered American administrated oil company. The company’s recent field tests
and studies suggest that one of their principal fields, Tsimiroro, have excellent po-
tential for economic development. At both Tsimiroro and Bemolanga, the two main
fields of Madagascar Oil, there are multi-billion barrel resource volumes in place
(Madagascar Oil, 14.08.2012). Production from the Tsimiroro steam flood pilot
project was expected to start in the fourth quarter of 2012. Despite the political
instability the start was celebrated on October 30th with representations from the
transition government. However it is worth noticing that the french friendly presi-
dent Rajoelina did not attend to the anglophone celebration despite the importance
of the production start.
Madagascar Oil has drilled over 68 wells the recent four years on the Tsimiroro Block
3104. They have also conducted geologic and reserves studies. Their result shows
that the Tsimiroro Field may contain over 5.5 billion barrels of total oil-in-place.
1.78 billion barrels can currently be classified as contingent oil-in-place, which means
that it is in a sub commercial stage and has a great chance of commercialization
(CRIRSCO and SPE, 2007). This is only studies conducted by one of the companies
exploring in Madagascar. (As a comparison Norwegian total estimated reserves,
including undiscovered reserves, are 82.4 billion barrels (Oljedirektoratet, 27.06.12)).
The Tsimiroro block is expected to reach a peak of production 12 years after pro-
duction start. Estimations indicate that Madagascar will by then place in the top
10 producers in Africa according to Madagascar Oil. Further discoveries are also
expected to be done, and could bring oil and gas production to higher levels. This
can potentially give the Malagasy government an important income.
Mineral Revenue Prospects The country has superior interest of keeping sovereignty
over own natural resources, but to improve investment climate and to increase for-
eign investment the country’s “Code Petrolier” was revised in 1996 with the aim of
getting a legal climate that enhances international investment incentives. (Loi N
96-018, Repoblikan’i Madagasikara, 1996). The law (art.51) gives exemptions from
royalties and direct tax on hydrocarbons that are either used directly into further
production, reintroduced into the deposits or are unusable. These exemptions are
crucial in attracting investors. By reducing the direct costs, through taxation on
economic activity in the initial non profiting phase, risk of default decreases and
companies might be willing to undertake more investment. The Code is further en-
couraging investors as article 48 states that paying “Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons”
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releases the companies from paying other taxes such as “Tax on Mobile Capital
Outcome”, “Tax on Lump-Sum Transfers” and “Tax on the Corporate Profits”. In
addition to reduce the tax costs of the companies it simplifies the administrative
costs on tax collection.
By using this taxing strategy, which is the same as Norway do, Madagascar has
improved the opportunity of attracting several petroleum companies. This will
according to Madagascar Oil, which is the largest of many operators in the country,
generate income of over US$ 2 billion a year to the Malagasy government for several
years and at least US$ 1 billion a year for a period of 20 years (Madagascar Oil,
14.05.2012). As the company is registered in the tax paradise Bermuda one shall
not be surprised if the revenue to the Malagasy government will not reflect the
companies profit. The cost of climate and environmental degradation is also most
likely left for the Malagasy government to cover.
Environmental challenges Petroleum production in Madagascar is potentially a
large threat to the environment. More than 80% of the island’s fauna and flora
are endemic, meaning that they are only found in Madagascar. Also, since the
island was inhabited around 2350 years ago only 10 % of its original forest remains.
Together this illustrates the huge responsibility that lies upon the implementers of
environmental challenging activities in the country.
Much of the country’s deposits are tar sand. However, available technology today
such as “steam assisted gravity drainage” (SAGD) is less polluting than traditional
mining industry. If a relative small revenue from oil production is payed in tax and
the Malagasy government do pay for the negative externalities that the degradation
of the environment is, one can question how much revenue will come to the benefit
of the local population.
From a prospect of efficiency and fairness one can still argue that petroleum pro-
duction in one of the world poorest country is defendable, despite the environmental
challenges. One can argue that it is fair that development countries can profit from
their resources the same way that western countries have done, long before the
knowledge we have today about environmental challenges related to petroleum and
CO2 emissions was available. In question of efficiency I would believe the only effi-
cient for Malagasy politicians is to make use of the natural resources. However, this
is a larger environmental debate that I do not have room for in my discussion here.
The discussion here is concentrated on redistributive mechanisms in Madagascar,
and more precisely on patronage. This is further described in chapter 3.
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3. Background for the thesis
3.1. Concepts and theories of patronage
What is patronage?
Patronage is when a politician favors his base of support when allocating economic
support (Moser, 2008). It is distinguished from vote buying because the politician’s
supporters will always vote for him, whether they get some privilege or not. Patron-
age can possibly hinder poverty reduction if the groups who receive benefits from
patronage are not the same as the poorest groups . Finan (2005) shows that, in
the case of Brazil, patronage may divert public goods from a need-based allocation.
Abers (2000) says that “Not only does this system tend to concentrate power in
the hand of incumbents who have access to state resources, but [patronage] also in-
hibits systematic planning and the implementation of generalized, egalitarian social
policies.” Patronage may, however, be implemented in different ways.
Different types of patronage
Patronage can occur in many ways. Moser (2008) finds that in Madagascar allo-
cation of projects funded by foreign aid are often motivated by patronage. Khwaja
and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow 45 percent
more and have 50 percent higher default rates than other firms. Allocation of devel-
opment projects and availability of cash and loans are important for development,
and may hinder poverty reduction if the poor are deprived from it due to patron-
age. This is often the case; as Abers (2000) and Finan (2005) show. Another type
of patronage is analyzed in Fisman (2001). He finds that the stock market value
of companies in Indonesia are heavily influenced by their connections to president
Suharto. The closer the connection was to the president, the heavier the stock mar-
ket value was influenced by shocks in Suharto’s health. The threat of his decease
was shown to reduce the stock market value of connected companies. Both increased
access to liquidity due to patronage as in Khwaja and Mian and increased profit as
in Fisman, increase income for the connected groups.
Construction of public infrastructure projects such as roads, road lighting, airports
and harbors is other possible ways to canalize economic patronage, by the president
devoting more means in areas with large bases of support, regardless of need. Such
projects will in themselves generate economic activity. In addition they will facili-
tate further production, resulting in more economic activity over time. Lump sum
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transfers to the population or tax cuts can be other mechanisms of patronage that
increase private spending, which in turn increases economic activity.
I do not look into what type of patronage that is prevalent in Madagascar. Rather I
concentrate on whether existence of patronage may be revealed using satellite light
data, but it is useful to understand the concept of patronage as a basis for my
analysis. As will be discussed further in chapter 4 on data and method, I assume
that several types of patronage generate economic activities that generate light and
therefore is visible on the satellite light data.
3.2. How patronage affects poverty reduction
The study of patronage is interesting because it has enormous implications on peo-
ple’s lives. If the group of poor is not the same as the group which the president
favors, patronage will hinder poverty reduction in two ways: Firstly the poor will
remain poor. Secondly the poor will continue to spend most of their energy on
survival strategies rather than productive activity that could generate growth and
increase resources available; and therefore reduce poverty. On the contrary; if the
group which the president favors, is the same group as the poor, patronage will
benefit the poor and reduce poverty.
Moser (2008) calculates that in Madagascar, with the existence of patronage, only
around 30% of communes that are in severe need of health care receives so. The same
is the case for communes that lack basic educational services. I will therefore assume
that patronage has negative effects on poverty reduction in Madagascar in the further
analysis of the thesis. When resources are scarce, and some receive benefits due to
patronage there will necessarily be less resources for others. Especially in poor
countries the use of patronage may hinder not only development, but also poverty
reduction when resources are not used where they are most needed. In Madagascar
more than 15 millions survive on less than 2 US PPP$ a day (UN Human Rights,
2012).
Moser (2008) diverts between needs-based motivation for distribution in opposition
to the motivation of patronage or vote-buying. A need-based motivation is usually
coinciding democratic preferences of the population in contrast to patronage that is
characterized by it’s non-democratic nature, favoring one specific group without any
democratic power to do so. By favoring one specific group, democratic principles
are violated. In a poor country patronage will even violate the human rights. When
resources are scarce and the need is great, an avoidance of allocating resources
towards groups that do not have access to resources to cover their basic needs such
as access to clean water, food, shelter, healthcare and education, is a violation of the
human rights. The same is true when vulnerable groups are systematically hindered
from access to participation and access to employment.
It might be fruitful to identify patronage before a large governmental increase in
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income from oil: Frank and Rainer (2012) use data from 18 Sub-Saharan countries
and find that “ethnic favoritism is more prevalent in countries where governments
have greater fiscal resources”. In the period I study; from 1992 to 2010 Madagas-
car’s fiscal resources are scarce. Nevertheless Moser (2008) results strongly indicate
ethnic favoritism in Madagascar. It therefore might be an advantage to identify an
discuss patronage before an substantial increase in government income from oil in
Madagascar. An identification of patronage as a characteristic of the political sys-
tem can possibly slow down the use of patronage or break the trend, witch in turn
can increase probability that the whole population, and especially the poor receives
the benefits of the country’s natural wealth.
3.3. An exploration of a previous study on patronage
in Madagascar
The research question in this thesis is inspired by Moser’s work, especially the work-
ing paper Moser (2010) that examines factors that determine the allocation of de-
velopment projects in Madagascar. The fact that the country is one of the poorest
in the world motivates Moser: “Given the high demand for and limited supply of
project funding, it is easy to imagine that personal, political or ethnic connections
could influence which localities receive development projects” (p1). Moser uses a
panel data set of nearly all 1395 communes in Madagascar for 2001 and 2007 and
finds that the political and ethnic characteristics of the recipient community heavily
influence the allocation of externally-funded projects in Madagascar. The results
show that “communes with mayors affiliated with the party in power tend to receive
more projects” (p.1). In addition the results show that “ethnically fragmented com-
munes, more isolated communes and those lacking in communication infrastructure
access fewer projects” (p.1). More importantly: “The empirical results demonstrate
that while development projects may be externally funded, their allocation is still
heavily influenced by internal political and social factors” (p.2).
Moser uses data from surveys from 2001 and 2007. The data is detailed and gives
information such as availability of health clinics, schools and pumped water. How-
ever data on mean income, poverty, unemployment and literacy rates are available
only from 1993 and are therefore time-invariant. Nevertheless Moser includes sev-
eral of these variables since “they are the only available nation-wide data and it is
likely that they are still used by decision-makers” (2010, p.13). The analysis ex-
ploits variation in the local leaders party affiliation and the change of president and
party in power at the national level during the period of study. Moser runs ordinary
least squares regressions and incorporates commune fixed effects in the panel data
to control for unobserved heterogeneity between communes.
Moser considers both the supply side and the demand side of development projects
in her study. The supply side are the one who fund the projects, the government
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that administrate them and the ones who implement them. The demand side are the
population and beneficiaries. The suppliers might be altruistic, wanting to maximize
benefits across localities. On the other hand they may allocate development projects
according to motivations of patronage and according to political and strategic in-
terests. Moser however emphasizes that one shall not ignore the local communities
ability to influence the allocation of projects themselves. It might be done through
lobbying, or by using personal, political or ethnic connections. Alternatively the
communes might simply apply for projects if information is available.
Availability of information is another aspect influencing mechanisms of redistribu-
tion. Moser (2010) “contributes to the literature related to the importance of access
to information. The results show a strong, positive association between access to
telephones and radio reception and the number of projects received“. She also found
that in Madagascar” [m]ore isolated communes and those lacking in communication
infrastructure access fewer projects” (2010). Knowing that decentralized areas often
are the poorest areas in developing countries (Ray: 1998, p36) this is bad news for
the large, poor and decentralized population in the country.
3.4. How can patronage be visible on the satellite
light data
The lack of data on economic growth and economic activity, both on local levels
and on national levels, and the wish of looking at data over time, are the reason
that I wish to explore other sources of data and method than what Moser (2010)
does. I explore the use of satellite light data as a proxy for economic activity. This
gives data for all years from 1992 to 2010 on all administrative levels, which gives
possibilities to explore trends of patronage over a period of nearly 20 years. Several
papers have recently used satellite light data on similar research. Hodler and Rashky
(2010) find that foreign aid fuels personal, regional and ethnic favoritism. By using
satellite data on nighttime light for 91 aid recipient countries in panel data from
1992 to 2005 they trace higher light density in the regions of the leaders’ birth.
Patronage seems to be linked to the quality of political institutions. Hodler and
Rashky (2010) further find that “in countries with poor political institutions the
effect is significantly higher in the region in which the current political leader was
born than in other regions” Hodler and Rashky (2010, p.1).
I want to explore whether patronage is a characteristic of Malagasy political system
over time. The satellite light data gives more information over time than what
Moser uses (2010), but less detailed information than the surveys used in Moser
(2010). Patronage however can be identified by exploring the variation of satellite
light density in different parts of the country. By looking at the light density on
regional levels relative to the total light density in the country I control for effects
that influence the whole country; such as trends in national economic growth. The
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data and method are further described in chapter 4.
Almost all economic activity demands light; light is generated both in the production
and in consumption of goods (Henderson et al., 2012). The different types of patron-
age mentioned in chapter 3.1 generate light in different ways. Foreign aid projects
generates lights in terms of light in health clinics or afternoon schools. Construction
projects will generate light if work is done in the evening, and when finished and
used at night time. Some aid projects generate electricity and light directly such as
solar cell panel projects. Development projects will often generate a general increase
in welfare in the society that contributes to both increased production and increased
consumption. Both are usually light consuming.
Increased availability of cash, either by lump sum transfers from the president, from
tax reduction, from increased availability of loans or from increased surplus from
businesses, are likely to increase both production and consumption. Production
will increase if the cash is invested in production. Consumption is increased either
by direct consume or through increased income from increased production. Public
infrastructure projects will increase light density when built. More importantly they
will facilitate other economic activity and therefore generate increased light density
over time.
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4.1. Light density data: a proxy for economic
development
I explore whether there is patronage in Madagascar in the period from 1992 to 2010.
Do sitting presidents favor their home community? In this chapter I will explain the
data and the method that I use. In order to look into the mechanisms of patronage
I need data on economic activity on local levels. Madagascar is a poor country
with weak statistics, especially on local levels of administration. I want to look at
patronage over time. By doing so I am able to see whether patronage is a charac-
teristic of Malagasy institutions. In most less developed countries it is very hard to
get good statistics on local levels. Henderson et al. (2012, p.994) says that “Rela-
tive to developed countries, in many developing countries a much smaller fraction
of economic activity is conducted within the formal sector, the degree of economic
integration and price equalization across regions is lower, and most significantly, the
government’s statistical infrastructure is weaker. These factors make the calculation
of nominal GDP (total value added, in domestic prices) difficult.”
The lack of traditional data has pushed researchers to explore other sources of infor-
mation. Satellite light density at night has been used as a proxy for local economic
activity in several papers recently, see for example Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2011), Henderson et al. (2012), Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012),
Hodler and Raschky (2010) and Chen and Nordhaus (2010).
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou write that light density captures “economic activi-
ties of the underground economy, which are not reflected in the aggregate statistics.
As the share of the shadow economy is high in Africa (La-Porta and Shleifer, 2008),
the usage of luminosity data i particularly desirable” (2011, p.8). The literature
argues that light density at night is a good proxy for economic activity as there is
a strong association between access to electricity, luminosity and public goods pro-
vision, especially across low income countries (p.9). Henderson et.al (2012, p.999)
argues that “consumption of nearly all goods requires light”. Further the access to
light improves other aspects of social welfare that are not necessarily measured by
GDP. Among other health and security in local communities are improved. Health
is improved as availability of light increases hygiene measures when household mem-
bers are ill. For instance bacteria are less likely to be transmitted with improved
hygiene. Security is improved and gender based violence reduced. Women are es-
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pecially vulnerable at night without lit streets and most households in developing
countries have sanitary facilities outside of the house. Also women get a more gen-
eral freedom of mobility after dark. In addition housework can be done at night
which allows women to work during day.
Access to light usually implies access to electricity which improves other aspects of
health and development. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) show for instance
a negative relationship between light density and infant mortality across African
regions, see their illustration shown in figure 4.1. This is a good argument for light
density as a good proxy for living standards. This suggests that, not only is the
light density a proxy for economic development, but for development in other crucial
aspects of human life. In some countries light density could be a better proxy for
living standards than GDP. Henderson et al. (2012) have looked into this and have
developed a welfare measure that is based on both GDP and light density.
Figure 4.1.: Light density as a proxy for living standards.
Source: Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011)
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) claim these night time satellite data are
uniquely suited for spatial analysis of economic development in Africa. I do find
that this is valid for Madagascar as well. Firstly, like most African countries, Mada-
gascar has low quality income statistics. Statistics that exists on the country’s four
administrative levels: commune (fokotany), district (fivondronana), region (faritra)
and autonomous province (faritany mizakatena) are often poor. Even at the na-
tional level income statistics are poor in most African countries. In the Penn World
Tables all African Sub Saharan countries get the lowest scores on data quality (Hen-
derson et.al, 2012 p.995). Secondly there is a great lack of data, some survey data
are available for Madagascar, but only for a very few years.
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4.2. The data
From 1992 until 2010 there are 31 satellite pictures available. The pictures are taken
by satellites and report night time images of the earth captured between 20:30 and
22:00 local time every day (Henderson et.al, 2012). All these pictures are processed
to make average light density images for every year. The luminosity data is from the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-
OLS) gathered by the United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The satellite sensors were originally designed for the purpose of detecting moonlit
clouds. They have run since the 1970s and are available digital from 1992. Recorded
lights from human settlements is a highly valuable byproduct. The data are pro-
cessed to select the highest quality data to distribute to the public. According to
NOAA (2012) a large number of constraints are used to select the highest quality
data. Henderson et.al (2012) explains that scientists at NOAA “remove observations
for places experiencing the bright half of the lunar cycle, the summer months when
the sun sets late [and] auroral activity”. In addition observations with clouds and
forest fires are excluded. The restrictions leaves mainly man-made light, as intense
sources of natural light are removed. These preparations of the data makes them
good for purposes of social science research.
The data is presented as .tif files, which is a type of georaster data, readable as
picture files. To be able to analyze the data they should be managed in the program
of ARC GIS. The data files are marked by the satellite and year. The data covers
-180 to 180 degrees longitude and -65 to 75 degrees latitude. The level of detail is
30 arc second grids, which is equal to 1/3600 of a degree (longitude and latitude),
and allows for detailed information on local level.
Furthermore there are three types of data available for each satellite and year:
- “cloud free coverage data”
- “the raw average visible band”
- “cleaned up average visible band”.
I have used the last one as it contains the lights from cities, towns, and other sites
with persistent lighting, including gas flares. Further ephemeral events, such as fires
have been discarded, and background noise has been filtered out and replaced with
values of zero (NOAA, 2012). Between the three types of data available this will
give the best proxy for econoimic activity in Madagascar. This file is also the one
used in the literature such as in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011). In table
4.1 available satellite data is presented. All satellites are running for several years
and most years are covered by more than one satellite.
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Table 4.1.: Satellite data available
Satellites F10 F12 F14 F15 F16 F18
1992 F10.1992
1993 F10.1993
1994 F10.1994 F12.1994
1995 F12.1995
1996 F12.1996
1997 F12.1997 F14.1997
1998 F12.1998 F14.1998
1999 F12.1999 F14.1999
2000 F14.2000 F15.2000
2001 F14.2001 F15.2001
2002 F14.2002 F15.2002
2003 F14.2003 F15.2003
2004 F15.2004 F16.2004
2005 F15.2005 F16.2005
2006 F15.2006 F16.2006
2007 F15.2007 F16.2007
2008 F16.2008
2009 F16.2009
2010 F18.2010
The satellites available (F10, F12, F14, F15, F16 and F18) are measuring average
visible stable lights and cloud free coverages for the years 1992-2010.
4.3. Data aggregation
To be able to observe the economic activity on local levels over time I need to ag-
gregate the light density. I have done so for all the regions and administrative levels
that have had a president. The results and trends are similar for the different admin-
istrative levels. Only data for the regions are therefore included in the presentation
of results and in the analysis in chapter 5. Data for the other administrative levels
are presented in Appendix B. To aggregate light density data within an adminis-
trative unit I have used the program ArcMAP, witch is a part of the geographical
design and analysis system ArcGIS. Two sources of data are used. Maps on admin-
istrative areas are taken from DIVA-GIS developed by Hijmans (2012). The night
time satellite image and data processing is from US NOAA’s National Geophysical
Data Center, who uses satellite data collected by US Air Force Weather Agency.
Each satellite image holds extremely large amounts of information since each pixel
on the image has a value. This demands large spaces on the hard disk. The method
I’ve used to prepare the data for analysis is further described in Appendix A. In total
I have prepared 124 maps to be able to do a proper analysis on three administrative
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levels. Much effort is also done in the calibration of the data, see Appendix A.
4.4. Method for identifying patronage
To be able to identify patronage I have used an approach of difference in difference
(diff-in-diff). The method requires data available both before and after “treatment”.
The treatment in this study is for one region to have a sitting president from its own
region. The method therefore requires the time series data that I have aggregated
as described above. When using a diff-in-diff approach I look at the differences
in trends for two units of study. Here that means that I look at the difference in
the trend in economic activity for example for the region of Toamasina and for the
whole country as such. The first difference is the difference over time for one unit,
for instance Toamasina. The second difference is the difference between the trends
of the the two units. A crucial assumption is made when using diff-in-diff: the trend
over time are equal for the two units we look at. This means that the trend in
economic activity in Toamasina is equal to the trend in the whole country when
there is no president from Toamasina. In absence of patronage it is plausible that
the trend of economic activity in Toamasina shall not be different from the whole
country. The presence of a difference in difference can suggest patronage. Figure
4.2 illustrates the method. The difference between the gray and the blue bullet at
t=1, minus the difference between the gray and the blue bullet at t=0 is the impact
of a “treatment”, here: of patronage.
Figure 4.2.: Method of difference in difference
Source: (Kotsadam, lecture notes, 2012)
The impact in this study is patronage. The hypothesis is that economic activity
increases in the sitting president’s home region when he is in power. One could
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argue that the economic activity should be reduced to the pre-trend levels, but it
is plausible that some positive economic effects may have an effect for a short time
after patronage upholds as well. It is also plausible that the effect of patronage
is not immediatly visible and therefore visible first after a year or more. For this
reason time series data are crucial for the analysis.
The main problem with diff-in-diff is that something else may have happened at the
same time. Another challenge with diff-in-diff is that the trend might be different
between the area from where an incumbent comes from and the whole country. On
example in Toamasina, which is the main harbor and experienced a larger growth
trend than the rest of the country, towards the end of the period of study, due to
the construction of pipe systems for transportation of nickel to the harbor and the
following export of this. Apart from this there are few indications of this to be the
case in this study. However, lack of data makes it difficult to control for omitted
variables.
Yet another relevant challenge for the analysis when using diff-in-diff on this question
is the population growth. A growth in population may be the reason for increase
in lights in a region. Increase in light will not reflect improved living standard per
capita, but only an increase in economic activity due to larger population in the
area. The population growth in the regions I study are equal to the growth in the
country and do therefore not represent a deviation in trend of economic activity.
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Due to the large number of results and figures to be presented, the analysis of the
results is done immediately after the presentation of each result. Also, to give a short
introduction, the summary of the results is presented in chapter 5.2, before the in-
dividual in-depth presentations and analysis of the results. There are five different
presidents in the period. One of them, the former one-party president Didier Ratis-
raka, governs a second period from 1997-2002. President Norbert Ratsirahonana
only governs for half a year and can hardly be considered to have had any political
or economic effect on the country. The presidents come from three different regions:
Toamasina, Diana and Analamanga. The three different home regions of the presi-
dents are presented in different sections in the chapter. The presentation therefore
deviates slightly from the chronology of their presidency. Table 5.1 below presents
the presidents, their period of govern and their home regions. The administrative
level of “region” is the second of four administrative levels. The home province and
home district of each president are presented in Appendix B.
Table 5.1.: The presidents, their period of presidency and their home regions.
President Period of presidency Region (adm. level 2)
Didier Ratsiraka June 1975 - March 1993 Toamasina
Zafy Albert March 1993 - Sept.1996 Diana
Norbert Ratsirahonana Sept.1996 - Feb.1997 Diana
Didier Ratsiraka Feb.1997 - July 2002 Toamasina
Mark Ravalomanana Feb.2002 - March 2009 Analamanga
Andry Rajoelina March 2009 - Analamanga
5.1. Expectations and methods of analysis
As discussed in chapter 3 the literature shows that the institution of patronage plays
an important role for economic activity and for distribution. Patronage is an archaic
institution that leads to distribution along other criteria than the criteria of need.
Moser (2008) have calculated that in Madagascar only 26 % of the communes which
qualify for health programs, under a regime of poverty minimization, will get access
to these programs in a regime of patronage. The numbers are 35% for education
programs and 65% for construction programs respectively. The higher number for
construction programs could be due to the visibility of such programs.
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Moser gets significant results, suggesting that patronage does play a role in the
allocation of social development programs (2008, p.149). My question is whether
the presidents in Madagascar favor their own regions over the period from 1992
until 2010 and I expect there to be active mechanisms of patronage in the political
and economic institutions of Madagascar during this period. I use two methods
to approach the hypothesis: a local analysis and a relative analysis. Both are
quantitative.
Local analysis In the local analysis I measure the change in light density in the
hometown of each president when he gets into power, and when he steps down
from the presidency. I measure the change in light density from the year before he
enters/leaves office and the year he actually enters/leaves office. Because it is likely
that it takes at least one year to implement patronage in a country, especially in a
poor slow-moving country, I also measure the change in light density from the year
before the president enters/leaves office and the year after he enters/leaves office, in
some regions. The second measurement gives a gap of one year. It is reasonable to
expect the trend of economic growth to be positive over time and therefore the trend
of change in light density to be positive as well. A negative shift in the observed light
when the president leaves office may therefore give stronger indications of patronage.
Here follows some of my expectations:
I expect the change in light density to be positive when comparing the year the
incumbent got into office with the previous year as an indication of patronage. This
will be visible in the figures as warmer colors of orange and red. The color scale below
shows that yellow means no change in light density. The warm colors of orange and
red represent an increase of respectively less than 3,5 in light density and more than
3,5 in light density. The cold colors of blue represent similar proportional reductions
in light density as the scale indicates.
-10 -
-3,5 - -10
-0,0 - -3,5
0
0 - 3,5
3,5 -
Equally I expect the change in light density to be negative when comparing the
year the president got out of office with the previous year. This will be visible in
the figures as different colder colors of blue. Because the incumbents are changed
at different months during the year and the satellite light only gives information
on a year level, and, as mentioned above, and discussed in chapter 3, because it is
likely that the effects of patronage need more than a year to be visible on satellite
lights, I also look at the difference between the year before the incumbent got into
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office and the year after. I then expect the change in light density to increase and
be warmer from the year the incumbent gained power till the year after he gained
power. Equally I expect there to be a reduction, that is negative and cold values,
in the light density from the year before the incumbent left power compared to the
year he left and the year after he left. See for instance figure 5.4 for an example.
The light densities have values between 0 and 63 in the satellite light data. The
number 0 means that no light is observed. Only 0,1 percent of the pixels globally
are censored at 63 (Henderson et.al, 2012). Madagascar, as a poor country, has
mainly low values, despite its’ population density that is similar to that of the US.
According to Henderson et al. (2012) 99.73% of Madagascar is censored as 0 when
measuring the average light density over the period 1992 to 2008. For a comparison,
less than 70% of the US is censored as 0, and 20% is between 6 and 62. In the
densely populated Netherlands, 88% of the country is censored between 6 and 62,
whereas only 8% is censored on these values in the even more densely populated,
but poor country, Bangladesh. The most common observations in Madagascar are
the values from 3 to 5. However, these values are registered in only 0.15% of the
country. This gives some powerful insight into the extreme poverty the country is
faced with, especially in rural areas. Figure 5.1 below illustrates this.
Only urban areas are registered on the satellite images to the right in figure 5.1,
despite the large populations in the rural areas of Madagascar as illustrated on the
left map in figure 5.1. The poor, rural Madagascar lacks electrical light and the
welfare that follows. The map of people per square kilometer, at the left, is from
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, based on data from
1998 and 2000. The light density map, on the right, is made by using satellite light
data from NOAA from 2000. On the satellite light map low values are indicated
by a darker color of red, in contrast to the population map. This is to be able to
actually observe the small units of light in the country.
Relative analysis The second method I use to approach the hypothesis is a relative
luminocity analysis. In the relative analysis I present the light censored in the
president’s region as a percentage of total censored light in the country. For instance
figure 5.3 shows that in 1992 Toamasina region stood for 11% of total light registered
in the whole country. The light in Toamasina Region had a dramatic drop of 50%
in 1993 to only 5.5% of total light in the country. By measuring light density in one
region relative to the whole country, factors that influence the whole country such
as national growth trends and global financial crisis are controlled for.
I expect the trend in light density in regions with a sitting president to be increasing
relative to the light density on national levels. Figure 5.2 presents an example of
the expectations of differences in trend if all else but the patronage is equal. Figure
5.2 does not represent real data and is only an example of how patronage would
be clearly read out of the data if all else is equal. The example strongly suggests
patronage in the period from 2002 to 2008.
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Figure 5.1.: Population density and light density in 2000
However, the real data are not as straight forward to analyze and some knowledge
of local context is an advantage to be able to do a proper analysis. There is much
noise in the data, as only factors that influence the whole country are controlled for.
Still, the data strongly suggests patronage in some periods and some areas. Keep
in mind that the different satellites are presented by different colors in the relative
luminosity figures and that the years with two colors have observations from two
satellites.
5.2. Summary of patronage in Madagascar 1992-2010
To give a short introduction to the complex story of patronage in Madagascar in
1992-2010, I will shortly sum up the results of the satellite light data and my analysis
of them, before presenting and discussing the details.
Didier Ratsiraka (1975-1993) and (1997-2002) The data show a decrease of
50% in light density in Toamasina, Didier Ratsiraka’s home town, after he left office
in 1993. This result suggests that the satellite light data reveals that president
Ratsiraka had a relationship of patronage towards his home region of Toamasina
in his period of govern that ended in 1993. The results from the second period of
govern from 1997-2002 show a lower difference(negative or positive difference?) in
the trend of economic activity during his govern, relative to when he did not govern.
However, the difference is remarkable. When Ratsiraka entered office in 1997 there
was an increase of 10% in light-registered economic activity in Toamasina region,
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Figure 5.2.: Revealed patronage: an example
whereas the reduction when he left office in 2002 was of nearly 20%. Both the
relative presentations of the results and the local three-dimensional figures suggest
patronage in both of president Didier Ratsiraka’s periods of govern.
Zafy Albert (1993-1996) President Zafy Albert won the elections based on the
democratic movements in Madagascar that were influenced by the same movements
globally. His outspoken policy was to concentrate on other aspects of politics than
neopatrimonial patronage . It is therefore not a surprise that the light data do not
suggest patronage under Zafy Albert’s govern.
Norbert Ratsirahonana (1996-1997) President Norbert Ratsirahonana governed
for only half a year and is considered a parenthesis in Malagasy economic and polit-
ical history. The light data are based on yearly averages and it is therefore difficult
to do a proper analysis for a president that governed for such a short period. The
nature of patronage also requires more time to be able to show its significanse.
Mark Ravalomanana (2002-2009) After a period of focus on democratic move-
ments in the country, and less focus on economic growth, president Mark Ravalo-
manana won the elections in 2002, a man considered to be a savior for the econ-
omy. He liberalized the economy and the data suggests that president Mark Ravalo-
manana was a patronizing president. The light data suggest that he had patronage
relations towards his hometown of Antananarivo, and especially towards a group
that shared his view on liberal economics, in the southern part of the capital. He
industrialized this part of the capital and the growth in economic activity in this
area is very clear on the figures of local luminosity.
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Andry Rajoelina (2009-) It might still be early to analyze the effects of the pres-
idency of the transitional president Andry Rajoelina. The data available are until
2010, only a year after he got to power. However, the data suggest a large differ-
ence in the trend of development in light density in the region of Toamasina during
Andry Rajoelina’s govern. This is interesting since Rajoelina is from the capital
but is accused of having patronizing relationships towards Toamasina. The relative
increase in light-registered economic activity is of as much as 100% in Toamasina
region after Andry Rajoelina came to power. It has increased from a fraction of
around 6% in the whole period of Mark Ravalomananas presidency to 13% in 2010.
There are good reasons to take former president Zafy Alberts worries about French
interests in Madagascar into considerations. The data suggests that there might be
mechanisms of patronage towards the region of Toamasina under the presidency of
the transitional non-democratic president Andry Rajoelina. I will come back to the
discussion of this result in the discussion in chapter 6.
5.3. Results and analysis of the results for the district
of Toamasina
In the following, the local and the relative analysis are presented in parallel. The
local results are presented as prepared satellite images of night time light. I have
zoomed in on the cities where the presidents come from and scaled the colors of the
pixels according to the color scale presented in chapter 5.1. These figures are three-
dimensional. Yellow indicates that there is no change in light density from one year
to the other. The different scales of cold colors of blue indicate a reduction in light
density and the warm colors of red and orange indicate an increase. All the maps
represent the difference from one year to another, as indicated in the description
of the figures. This means that the values of the pixels are not the observed light
density, but the difference in the density in each specific pixel from one year map to
another.
It is worth noticing that for the cities on the coast, such as Toamasina, the light
observed offshore on the prepared satellite images (see for instance figure 5.4) is
not included in the relative analysis. The method used to aggregate data uses the
borders as limits and the reflection of light in the ocean could wrongly give too high
values of light density.
The relative presentation of the results show a region’s share of light relative to
total light registered in the country for the period of 1992-2010. Keep in mind
that by doing so, effects that influence the whole country are controlled for. The
results are presenting the “second difference” in trend, as explained in chapter 4.4
on the difference in difference approach. The different colors of the graphs represent
data from different satellites. Keep in mind that the years with two columns have
observations from two satellites. I have chosen to include both to give the true
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picture of the results from the data. The circles on the graphs indicate the periods
when there is a president from the region. In figure 5.3 an extra circle is included
because I want to look into whether the president in 2009 and 2010 has patronizing
relations to the region of Toamasina because of accusations that claim he does.
President Ratsiraka governs from 1975 - 1993.
Toamasina: effects when he leaves office in 1993 President Didier Ratsiraka
is from the district of Toamasina. He led a socialist experiment on the country
with strong relations to communist countries (Dahl, 2008 p.132). He entered office
in June 1975 and left office in March 1993. Scandals of corruption in state-led
companies and devaluation of the Malagasy currency led the country and especially
the economy into a large crisis in the last years of his govern. The period of 1991,
1992 and 1993 represent a political crisis that nearly led the country into a civil
war. The population was largely dissatisfied with president Didier Ratsiraka and
his failed socialist experiment. Despite the political crisis, Toamasina, Ratsiraka’s
home region and the main harbor of the country, represented a large fraction of the
country’s economic activity in 1992.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that Toamasina region stood for more than 11% of total light
density in Madagascar in 1992. According to population numbers from the World
Bank, Toamasina stood for only 6% of the country’s population in 1992. The results
can indicate that Toamasina was much richer than the rest of the country in 1992.
Toamasina’s fraction of the country’s population is stable on 6-7% for the whole
period I study. It is therefore interesting to read the results in figure 5.3 that
measure only a fraction of 5.5% light density in Toamasina in 1993. Controlled for
the fraction of population, this represents a decline of 50% in light density in only
one year. A similar effect is found on all administrative levels, see the graphs in
Appendix B.
It is also interesting that on neither of the administrative levels does the region of
Ratsirakas hometown gain the same relative levels of economic activity, relatively
to the whole country, until the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. I will come back to
this under the analysis of Toamasina in this period.
Both illustrations in figure 5.4 show the same strong decline in light density in
Toamasina from the last year Ratsiraka governed to the first and second following
year. The blue colors indicate a negative change. The darker blue represents a
strong cooling of the economic activity. The result from the difference from 1992
to 1994 is included to the right in figure 5.4 and strengthens the argument. The
change in light density is still negative. The negative change in light density from
the last year in office for President Didier Ratsiraka until two years after, gives
indications that strengthen the theory of the Toamasina region suffering for loosing
their patronizing president. The economic activity is still not back to the level it
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had before Ratsiraka left office, after two years with a new president from another
region.
Figure 5.3.: Light density in Toamasina Region as a fraction of the whole country.
Description of figure 5.3: Trends in the fraction of light density in President Didier
Ratsiraka’s home region relative to the whole country. The periods in the two first
circles are the periods when he was in power. The period when Andry Rajoelina
governs is included in the last circle.
The reduction in economic activity observed by the negative change in light density
suggests patronage in Toamasina. Since the trend of economic growth is normally
positive, this can be interpreted as a clear indication that mechanisms of patronage
can have played a role in Ratsiraka’s relation to his hometown Toamasina.
An alternative explanation could be that the city of the national harbor is hit more
strongly by the political and economic crisis than the rest of the country. However
the reduction is severe and lasts for a very long period. The end of Ratsiraka’s
government could have immediate effect on economic activity because he had to flee
the country and went to exile in France. It is likely that he had to give up control
of both public and private initiatives with immediate effect when he left. The
results are not surprising, knowing that Didier Ratsiraka governed as a one-party
leader for 17 years and had a long period to build up mechanisms of patronage. It
would be interesting to look into the period before 1992 if these satellite light data
get digitalized and published to see whether the large fraction of light registered
in Toamasina region in 1992 is representative for the period of Didier Ratsiraka’s
one-party presidency.
A weakness when looking at the trend before and after Ratsirakas presidency in the
early 1990s is, as mentioned, that there is only data from one year prior to his loose
of presidency. Another weakness is that the main harbor of the country might be
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Figure 5.4.: Toamasina town: differences from 1992-1993 and 1992-1994.
influenced by many other factors than patronage that I am not able to control for
here.
President Ratsiraka governs from 1997 to 2002.
Toamasina: effects when he enters office in 1997 Despite the democratic move-
ments in early 1990s Ratsiraka regained political power, won the presidential elec-
tions in 1997 and came back from France. According to the data suggesting patron-
age in his former period of presidency, one would expect to see an increase in the
trend of economic activity also in his next period of presidency, from 1997 till 2002,
in the relative analysis in figure 5.3. The long term trend is actually the opposite;
mainly negative until 2005. However, figure 5.3 show that there is a greater level of
economic activity the first two years of Ratsirakas new period of presidency. From
representing 7% of the country’s economic activity, the level of economic activity
in Toamasina increases by nearly 10% to 8% when Ratsiraka entered office. For
relative illustrations of the other administrative levels, see appendix B.
The local analysis in figure 5.5 does not give a clear image of whether there is
an overall increase or decrease in light density from the year before Ratsiraka got
into power again, in 1996, to the year he is back in charge in 1997. However, the
illustration to the right in figure 5.5 is clearly warmer. This can reflect an optimism
among president Didier Ratsiraka’s group of base and suggest that patronage is
playing a role in the start of the president’s new governing period. The illustration
in figure 5.5 suggests that patronage is stronger the second year of governance than
the first.
However, there are many factors that can affect the satellite light and the economic
activity at the same time as patronage. Still there is not enough evidence in data
to reject that there is no patronage towards Toamasina during Didier Ratsiraka’s
second presidency. On the contrary it is likely that it requires large effort and a
longer period of time for Ratsiraka to build up his former empire and possibilities
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Figure 5.5.: Toamasina town: differences from 1996-1997 and 1996-1998.
for patronage. The relatively higher fraction, even thought it is small, of economic
activity during his second presidency compared to the period after, might therefore
suggest patronage.
Toamasina: Effects when president Ratsiraka leaves office in 2002 The effect
of patronage is expected to be most visible when the incumbent leaves office. A
negative change indicates a larger change than a positive because, all else equal, the
trend of economic activity is expected to be positive. Figure 5.6 suggests therefore
that there is a drawback effect for Toamasina, from 2001 to 2003, when president
Didier Ratsiraka left office. However, keep in mind that there can be good reasons
to exclude the light from the ocean. The results are therefore not unambiguous.
The fraction of light censored in Toamasina is lower in the 3-4 years after Didier
Ratsiraka lost the presidency than before. From representing a fraction of 6-7% of
the country’s light, it reduces by almost 20% to represent only a fraction of 5% of
total light censored in the country in a period of four years after Ratsiraka left office.
Keep also in mind that Toamasina region’s fraction of the country’s population is
stable over the whole period so emigration from the region is not the driving factor
for the reduction. It is likely that data suggest patronage towards the region of
Toamasina in the period when Ratsiraka governed 1997-2002, and it stopped when
he left office in 2002.
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Figure 5.6.: Toamasina town: differences from 2001-2003.
President Rajoelina is the sitting transitional president since 2009:
Toamasina: effects when he enters office in 2009 In January 2009 a period of
political instability started. The leader of a political opposition movement Andry
Rajoelina (then mayor of Antananarivo) sought to oust President Marc Ravalo-
manana from the presidency. On the 21 of March 2009 Andry Rajoelina was of-
ficially declared the president of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar.
The international community immediately condemned the leader and his ascension
as unconstitutional and financial support and foreign investments stopped. The
country fell into one of the worst economic crises in its history.
Despite the economic crisis the illustration to the left in figure 5.7 shows that there
was a significant increase in economic activity in Toamasina from 2008 till 2009.
The size of the city has also increased towards the south when comparing figure 5.6,
which shows the beginning of the 2000s, and figure 5.7, showing the end of 2010s.
The transitional president Rajoelina is not from Toamasina, he is from the Merina
tribe in the region of the capital. I therefore find it interesting that while the rest
of the country goes into an economic crisis, Toamasina blossoms.
Figure 5.7.: Toamasina town: differences from 2008-2009 and 2008-2010.
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It is also interesting that on neither of the administrative levels (see also Appendix B)
does the region of Ratsiraka’s hometown gain the same relative levels of economic
activity, relatively to the whole country, until the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010.
These years coincide with the period when the transition president Rajoelina was
in power. As mentioned, Rajoelina is from the Merina tribe from the highlands and
does not have ethnic or obvious patronizing relations to Toamasina. However, the
main common feature of Rajoelina and Ratsiraka are their loyalty to France, where
ex-president Ratsiraka is living in exile. Could the night time satellite light data
suggest that there are mechanisms of patronage towards Toamasina in the period
when Rajoelina governs? If so, could this be related to French interests in the
petroleum resources? Former president Zafy Albert accuses France of directing the
political instability in Madagascar (Dahl, 2011). This must be done in cooperation
with someone with a broad network in the country. A cooperation between former
president Didier Ratsiraka, the transitional non-democratic president and French
interests is not impossible.
While the rest of the country is in an economic crisis Toamasina has increased
activity relative to the country.The light density increases with over 100% from the
period of Mark Ravalomananas presidency (2002-2009), when the fraction of light
in Toamasina relative to the whole country was of only 6%, till 2010 when the
fraction increased to 13%. The data could suggest patronizing mechanisms from
the sitting president towards the hometown of former president and France-friend
Didier Ratsiraka.
The illustration to the right in figure 5.7 shows another picture, showing that the
change in economic activity from 2008 till 2010 is strongly negative. This could
indicate that also Toamasina got negatively influenced by the economic crisis after
two years with the transition president. However, the satellite that measures the
light density in 2010; F18, only has one observation and the measurement of a new
satellite might be slightly less reliable the first year it is running, despite of the data
being calibrated.
5.4. Results and analysis for two districts in the
north: Ambilobe and Antsiranana
President Zafy Albert governs from 1993 - 1996:
Ambilobe: effects when he enters office in 1993 President Zafy Albert was the
first democratically elected president in Madagascar. He comes from the northern
region of Diana, from the town of Ambilobe. Ambilobe is the smallest town in figure
5.8, represented by the light in the bottom corner to the right. Zafy Albert is a doctor
and former Minister of Health from the period before Didier Ratsiraka’s one-party
govern. President Zafy Albert represented a democratic hope and democratic spirit
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after the long nondemocratic govern by Didier Ratsiraka. Zafy Albert’s popularity
and the wind of democratization that inspired the Malagasy people must be seen in
relation to the global wind of democratization after the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the Soviet Union in 1989 (Dahl, 2008). Zafy Albert’s focus on democratic processes
might have reduced the neopatrimonial tradition of patronage. One of Zafy Albert’s
goals was to settle with former president Didier Ratsiraka, including the patronage
that was integrated in the Malagasy socialism he represented.
The local analysis in figure 5.8 shows both an increase and a decrease in light density
in the town of Ambilobe, Zafy Albert’s home town, from 1992 to 1993. The change
in light density does not give any indications of patronage as the change is neither
generally positive nor negative.
Figure 5.8.: Ambilobe town: difference from 1992-1993.
However, in the relative luminosity data the trend of light density in Ambilobe is
increasing relative to the trend in the whole country. Figure 5.9 show that there is an
increase in light density in Ambilobe the period Zafy Albert is in office, compared
to the previous period. This could be an indication of patronage if nothing else
happens at the same time. The results are the same at the provincial level and on
the level of district, see Appendix B. However, the activity in Diana region is “bungee
jumping” in his period of govern. The data do not have any clear suggestions. Still,
the hypothesis of patronage can not be rejected. There might be some mechanisms
of patronage at place, that can not be revealed by the use of satellite light data.
Equally likely is it that the focus on democratic change dominates effects of the
neopatrimonial institution of patronage.
Ambilobe: Effects when president Zafy Albert leaves office in 1996 When
Zafy Albert leaves office in 1996 light density is spread out on a much larger area in
his hometown than it was before he came to power, indicating growth in the period,
see figure 5.10 compared to figure 5.8. This can be an indication of patronage. The
result in figure 5.10 also suggests patronage as the whole town has a negative shift
in light density and economic activity after their president left office. As discussed
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Figure 5.9.: Light density in Diana Region as a fraction of the whole country.
Description of figure 5.9: President Zafy Albert and President Norbert Ratsiraho-
nana’s home region: trends in light density relative to the whole country. The circle
represents the years of Zafy Albert’s presidency.
previously, a negative shift when the president leaves is more likely to indicate
patronage than a positive shift when he enters office. It is likely that the trend in
economic growth is positive rather than negative from one year to another. The
negative shift is therefore interesting. However, figure 5.9 shows that, despite the
drop of 20% in light density; from measuring a fraction of 10% in 1996 to only 8%
in 1997, there is a similar increase of 20% again from 1997 to 1998 in the fraction
of light density in the region relative to the whole country. The data presented in
figure 5.9 shows that despite that the fraction of light registered in Diana region is
fluctuating, it does not seem that there is any correlation in trends with the period
of presidency from the region. In contrast to Moser’s results based on data from only
two random years, my use of data over time reveals this potentially wrong analysis of
the data. Even though I can not reject that there is patronage, there is no suggestion
in the data for patronage in Diana region during Zafy Alberts presidency. This is
consistent with the knowledge of his focus on democratization rather than economic
aspects.
Another aspect that is worth noting when analyzing the fractions of light in Diana
region is that there is an increase of nearly 40% of light density from 2009 to 2010.
According to Dahl (2011) local media report that enormous amounts of illegally
logged rosewood from the national parks in Diana region have been confiscated in
recent years. A closer look at the satellite light data reveals large decentralized in-
crease of light in the national parks during the present transitional political period.
The transitional president Andry Rajoelina said in his speech to the United Nations
on the 26 of September 2012 that despite the suspension of international aid during
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his presidency, which used to represent 60% of the national budget, they manage to
run the governmental administration and their projects normally (Rajoelina, 2012).
Members of higher authorities are accused of standing behind the illegal logging in
cooperation with Chinese companies (Dahl, 2011). The illegal logging and dramatic
degradation of the remaining of Madagascar’s endemic rainforest seems to be financ-
ing the non-democratic president and his government. WWF “strongly condemn the
traffic of these hardwoods as [they] can see no benefit going to the local people’s
livelihoods” (WWF, 2010).
This example suggests that the causal relationship goes the other way around. In-
creased light density is not due to the president patronizing a region and improving
living conditions for the local population. Rather the increase in economic activity
can be due to the president’s plundering of a region for own benefit. However, since
president Andry Rajoelina does not have any patronizing obligations towards the re-
gion of Diana, the indication of plundering of this regions natural resources, does not
reject patronage towards own region. On the contrary, it is less likely that Rajoelina
would plunder his own region, considering the historical roots of patronage.
Figure 5.10.: Ambilobe town: difference from 1996-1997.
President Norbert Ratsirahonana; a parenthesis in Malagasy economic history.
Antsiranana: effects when he enters office in 1996 and leaves office in 1997.
The govern of Norbert Ratsirahonana, who is from the district of Antsiranana, the
same region and province as Zafy Albert, can be considered as a parenthesis in
Malagasy political and economic history. He reigned from September 1996 until
February 1997. Based on the previous indications that patronage needs some time
to have any effect, it is unlikely that we shall see any effect in Antsiranana from the
6 months of Norbert Ratsirahonana’s governance.
The figures in figure 5.11 could however suggest, all else equal, that such a mecha-
nism may be in place. There is a large increase in light density from 1995 to 1996,
and a matching reduction from 1996 to 1998. However, the northern region is espe-
cially exposed to variations in logging legislation of protected species of wood. In
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legislative “windows” of export possibilities, activity might be much higher. This
can result in an unstable level of economic activity and it is likely that this vari-
ance in economic activity drives the changes in light density to a larger degree than
mechanisms of patronage.
Figure 5.11.: Antsiranana town: difference from 1995-1996 and 1996-1998.
5.5. Results and analysis for the capital Antananarivo
President Marc Ravalomanana governs from 2002-2009
The capital Antananarivo: effects when he enters office in 2002 Marc Ravalo-
manana was elected president in the elections in December 2001 with a majority in
the first round. He took office as president in February 2002 despite that the former
president Didier Ratsiraka did not want to step down from the presidency until July
2002. Ravalomanana was re-elected in December 2006, again with a majority in the
first round. Ravalomanana resigned under pressure to the non-democratic president
Andry Rajoelina in March 2009.
The figures of the capital are more difficult to analyze than other cities. The region
has more than half of all light observed in the whole country. The exogenous and
endogenous factors that affect light density are many more and of much larger size
here than elsewhere in the country.
Figure 5.12 represents the change in light density, as a proxy for economic activity,
in the capital from 2001 to 2002, and from 2001 and 2003. The areas in the inner
city, which make up the old city center, experience a decrease in the beginning of
Mark Ravalomana’s presidency. In contrast the suburbs and especially the south
of the city experience a large growth. These are the areas of industrialization that
Mark Ravalomana prioritized during his presidency in his work on liberalizing the
economy.
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Figure 5.12.: Antananarivo town: differences from 2001-2002 and 2001-2003.
When looking at the trend of light density in the province of Antananarivo and the
region of Antananarivo over time, the picture is quite stable. This is not surprising
since this region contains more than half of the country´s light. It is also likely that
aspects that affect the whole country also affect the region of the capital. What
is worth noticing is the increase towards the second half of Mark Ravalomananas
govern, marked in the first circle in figure 5.13. From 2006 till 2007 for instance,
there is an increase in the fraction of light registered in the capital of 25%. From
representing 55% of the country´s light density in 2006 the capital represents 70% of
the light density the previous year. This result indicates that the capital has grown
much more than the rest of the country in the period of Mark Ravalomananas govern.
The satellite light data suggest patronage in the region of the capital, Analamanga
region, under the presidency of Mark Ravalomanana.
Another interesting aspect is the large reduction in the fraction of light in the capital
region under the presidency of the transition president Andry Rajoelina. Since the
numbers are relative to the whole country, some large increase in economic activity
must take place elsewhere in the country or there must be a large decrease in eco-
nomic activity in the capital. This means that we are most likely not only talking
about the effects of the financial crisis. As figure 5.3 shows it seems that the province
and region of Toamasina is getting some of the relative increase in economic activity
since the transitional presidency entered office. Some of this increase might be due
to the construction of nickel industry in Toamasina. More important is it that pres-
ident Mark Ravalomanana, who liberalized the economy and facilitated economic
investments for businessmen in the capital, lost the presidency. The non-democratic
president following him has tried to ruin Ravalomananas economic empire, aiming
to increase the dissatisfaction of him among the population. For instance areas of
industry in the capital were vandalized and destroyed during the political instability
in 2009. The satellite light data captures this reduction in economic activity in the
capital. The fraction of light is reduced from 55% to 46% from 2008 to 2010. This
represents a reduction in light in the capital of nearly 20% from the period before
the transitional government till two years after.
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Figure 5.13.: Light density in Analamanga Region as a fraction of the whole
country.
Description of figure 5.13: President Marc Ravalomanana’s and Transitional Pres-
ident Andry Rajoelina’s home region: trends in light density relative to the whole
country. The circles indicates the periods Ravalomanana and Rajoelina governed.
Ravalomanana from February 2002 to March 2009 (he was reelected in 2006) and
Rajoelina from March 2009.
The capital Antananarivo 2009:
President Marc Ravalomanana leaves office and President Andry Rajoelina en-
ters office Figure 5.14 shows the changes in light density in the capital in absolute
numbers, that is; not relative to the whole country. We observe that there was still
growth in the capital from 2008 to 2009, illustrated by the warm colors of red and
orange. The cold colors of blue in the illustration of the difference in light density
from 2009 to 2010 show a severe reduction in economic activity. There is a huge
reduction of the economic activity, and no increase in any parts of the capital, under
the non-democratic president Andry Rajoelina.
However, some of the reduction from 2009 to 2010 might be due to the new satellite
F18. As discussed previously there are reasons to look further into the reliability of
the data from this satellite, since it is the first year running of a new satellite and
the only observation from this satellite. An argument for relying on the data also
from F18.2010 is that it is calibrated.
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Figure 5.14.: Antananarivo town: differences from 2008-2009 and 2009-2010.
The results in this chapter give strong indications for patronage in Madagascar in
the period from 1992 to 2010. Both the president from the eastern coast Didier Rat-
siraka and the two presidents from the highlands, Mark Ravalomanana and Andry
Rajoelina seem to have patronizing commitments towards their regions according to
the satellite light data. For the presidents from the North, Zafy Albert and Norbert
Ratsirahonana there the data can not clearly suggest patronage.
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6. Discussion
I will shortly undertake two discussions. The first is about the method; the use of
satellite data as a proxy for economic development, and the reliability of the results.
The second is about the reasons for patronage and the possible effects of patronage,
especially upon increased oil income.
6.1. Method and results.
The use of satellite light data as a proxy for economic development has some great
advantages and some major challenges. Satellite data is an especially welcome tool
when doing research on economic development on local levels in developing countries,
due to lack of data. Light density can be an important tool for cross national studies.
Different countries often have different measures of GDP. When working on cross
national data, it is therefore often hard to compare data across countries. The light
data is claimed to be of similar quality across the globe. In addition to these positive
features the data is free and can be downloaded from the web.
The strength of the data when measuring economic activity is that nearly all con-
sumption of goods at night requires electricity and light. As income increases,
consumption usually increase and light usage per person increase. When trying to
find whether there is patronage in Madagascar or not, the use of light density is
therefore an innovative and good use of data.
In some countries, light density can be a better proxy for living standards than
GDP. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou write that light density captures “economic
activities of the underground economy, which are not reflected in the aggregate
statistics. As the share of the shadow economy is high in Africa (La-Porta and
Shleifer, 2008), the usage of luminosity data is particularly desirable” (2011, p.8).
Furthermore the access to light improves health and security in local communities.
It measures more aspects of human welfare than GDP does. Also large amounts
of private surplus are invested in other countries than where it is earned. These
numbers will appear in GDP, but not necessarily in the satellite data. GDP can in
some cases measure too much economic activity and growth, whereas light density
measures a more true picture of actual growth in the country over time. For example,
the use of tax havens, where companies invest their profit in another branch of the
company, localized in a country where they pay no tax, hinders a potential trickle
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down effect of larger economic investments. This in turn reduces the country’s
conditions for economic growth and poverty eradication.
However, the use of satellite night time light has some major challenges as well. The
main challenges met in the work on the creation of time series for Madagascar was
the need for calibration of the satellites. To explore the effects of patronage over
time, satellites that measured the same object at the same time must give the same
data. Even using the calibration method developed by NOAA did not give clean
calibrated data. Therefore the advantages discussed above might not come without
a cost of some insecurity in the data. When doing research using data from only
one satellite, the results might be more reliable as there is no need for calibration.
Another challenge is whether to include offshore data. In the methods used here
I have excluded offshore light. The main reason is that much offshore light might
be due to glare from onshore activity in the harbor towns. Including offshore glare
would give too large numbers of light density relative to towns inland. Another
reason not to include the light from the ocean is that fishing in the sea around
Madagascar to a large degree are shipped to other countries without leaving much
surplus in the country. Much offshore light will then most likely not be related to
patronage.
However, despite some challenges in the use of the data, the literature seems to
embrace the method that gives a whole new base of data to explore.
6.2. Patronage: reasons and effects.
The results in chapter 5 suggest that patronage is an important mechanism in eco-
nomic activity in Madagascar. Since the groups that benefit from patronage to a
large degree are different from the groups of poor (Moser, 2008), such mechanisms
can contribute to less reduction in poverty than could otherwise have been possible.
Considering that Madagascar is one of the worlds poorest countries, patronage can
have fatal consequences for the poor and underprivileged groups of the population.
Patronage will also be an inefficient way of redistribution, in terms of welfare max-
imization, as the ones with the highest marginal utility of the resources are not the
ones who receive them.
The data strongly suggests that I can reject that there is no patronage. However,
there are many things going on in the same periods and the geographical areas that
disturb the picture. One aspect that could have an impact on the economic activity,
that is not caused by patronage are cyclones. But cyclones may be correlated with
patronage, as the incumbent might use that as a reason for increasing the transfer
of goods and the facilitation of economic activity in the region. Other disturbances
are positive income that are irregular, such as the export of exclusive lumber.
In Madagascar, the incumbent may legalize sale of expensive, fine-grained lumber
such as rosewood and ebony for a short period after cyclones. The reason for doing
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so is that cyclones might have damaged trees to the extent that they must be logged
and a potential gain from cyclone damaged trees shall not be stopped. However the
windows in legislation for export of rosewood and ebony after cyclones creates an
illegal marked for logging. The areas of expensive and fine-grained lumber are in
the north and therefore not likely to influence economic activity in Toamasina and
Antananarivo. However, it is a variable that is more relevant in the discussion of
the results for the presidents from the north.
Another variable that might affect the fraction of light density in a region is pop-
ulation growth and migration. The population in Madagascar have grown to the
double from 1992 to 2010. The growth paths in the regions I am looking at are
the same as in the country in total. The fraction of population in the regions of
Diana, Analamanga and Toamasina are therefore constant over the period. Popu-
lation growth and migration will therefore not affect the fractions of light density
in the regions and do not have any important effect on the analysis of patronage by
the presidents towards their home regions.
This is also the case for the analysis of Toamasina under the govern of the transitional
president Andry Rajoelina, who is from an other region. Population growth does
not seem to be the driving factor for the increase in the fraction of light density and
economic activity in the Toamasina region in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The fraction of
population in Toamasina is constant on 6% in the whole period from 1992 till 2010
despite of the doubling in population in the country.
Another development in Toamasina in recent period is some large investments in
production of nickel that is refined in Toamasina. This can be a secondary explana-
tion of the increased fraction of light density in Toamasina under the govern of the
transitional president that is accused of close relations to French interests as some
of the large increase in light density in Toamasina, in 2009 and 2010, can be traced
to the economic activities related to the preparation of this industry. The actual
production started in 2012, but the building of the refinery and other installations
have generated large amounts of economic activity in the period prior to the start of
production. However, the large increase in light density is likely to come from other
sources as well and I can not reject that there is no patronage towards Toamasina
under the presidency of Rajoelina. The data could even suggest that the incumbent
who came to power in March 2009 after a longer period of instability have indi-
rect patronage commitments towards Toamasina. This could indicate that French
interests in Madagascar are strong, especially in the recent years, as production of
valuable natural resources are starting.
According to Mehlum et al.(2006) the quality of institutions is a decisive factor in
whether a country will be trapped in the resource curse or benefit from natural
resources. According to the results in chapter 5 a clear advice to the Malagasy
government will be to look into the institution of patronage. If this aspect of the
local informal institution can be repealed; one aspect of the resource curse threat for
the country may be reduced. More energy can then be used on poverty eradication.
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Taxation is another key to avoid the resource curse. Through the tax income a
democratically elected government can administrate the wealth and provide social
services to the population. An investment in social services such as schooling and
health will increase human capital which again raises economic growth and the
potential curse will be no curse, but a benefit for the whole country for generations.
Another way to distribute income from natural resources is to redistribute cash like
the custom is in Alaska. This increases individual freedom, but does not unfold the
potential of the society.
However, related to taxation and redistribution Moser (2010) argues that the local
population should require better coverage by the media, and more easily access
to the media. Information gives power. By getting information rural populations
can demand transparency to secure that tax revenues are indeed spend on projects
for the population, and not according to mechanisms of patronage. Availability of
information is crucial for right holders to hold the duty bearers accountable. But
be capable to do so requires proper information, and to be ability to read and to
analyze information the population must get access to basic education.
The income might be extracted in a very short period. This might create a boom
in the economy that is harmful for the entire economy over time. This mechanism
can be down-scaled by the use of a petroleum fund. A petroleum fund can also
redistribute over generations, which might be considered fairer than keeping all
surplus from a resource that has used hundreds of generations to accumulate and
getting valuable, for one or two random generations.
It likely that the mechanisms of patronage will continue to play its role when the
country starts to benefit from the petroleum production. If measures of efficiency or
measures of righteousness are thought to make the foundation of redistribution, sev-
eral precautions could be taken to avoid distribution based on for instance patronage
towards own ethnic groups. From the government’s side, considering fairness, there
should be allocation mechanisms ensuring a rather need based redistribution scheme.
If the presidents were democratically elected, the redistribution they decide upon
reflects the peoples’ will. Following this argument an allocation of public resources
based on ethnicity can be defended as democratic. However, prioritizing according
to basic needs would be in accordance with the UN human rights, which is often
believed to be universal. One could also consider basic capabilities instead of basic
needs, giving the individuals more freedom over own lives.
Following Sen’s (1993) capability approach I believe each society could, in a demo-
cratic manner, for instance by the parliament, make a list of basic capabilities. By
doing so the moral foundation of consideration of a good life and the foundations
of redistribution would be cultural sensitive, as Sen suggests talking about develop-
ment as freedom (2000). Such a basis for redistribution might be more democratic
than following a list from the UN, which does not have a democratic mandate,
organizational structure, and even less, balance of power. It might also be more
democratic than regular redistribution schemes since the parliament represents all
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political parties, in contrast to the government.
The contribution of this thesis is to encourage a discussion, about distributive mech-
anisms in the country, among the Malagasy people, and especially among the poor
majority of the Malagasy people, who are powerful if they are able to use their
democratic voice. The results in the thesis suggest patronage in Madagascar, based
on neutral data from outer space that, despite their weaknesses, are not biased by
any political agenda or poor availability of data. My hope is that the natural wealth
in Madagascar can benefit the local population by eradicating poverty, enhance eco-
nomic growth and develop a welfare state, all by enabling Malagasy men, women,
boys and girls to live their lives with the dignity every human being are entitled to.
Identifying and reducing patronage that do not benefit the poor can be one little
step on that path.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Method used to prepare data for analysis
Due to the size of the data sets I have first cut out a polygon around Madagascar. By
doing so, the size of the data for one year satellite image is reduced from 709 000 KB
to 1 800 KB and I keep only the information I need. This gives me the possibility to
store the new maps I create. Data aggregation within borders is done by using the
program tool “Zonal Statistics; Zonal” in the “Spatial Analyst Tools” in the program
ArcMAP. By doing so on all data set available on the administrative levels of: the
nation, the autonomous province (faritany mizakatena), the region (faritra) and
the district (fivondronana) I get 124 maps as a base for the information I need (31
satellite/year * 4 administrative levels). In the analysis I look at effects of patronage
in the administrative units that have bread a president. To give a better analysis
I create time series over the different administrative levels mentioned above. By
looking at the different administrative levels I can identify whether local affiliation
or regional affiliation is strongest. By using time series I can look at the effects
over time and not only around time of elections. Data on light density within the
administrative areas of interest are collected manually.
A.2. Calibration of satellites
Different satellites measuring a region in the same year are in principle measuring
the same object. However, when I aggregate the total observed light density in
Madagascar I find that different satellites give different measurements on the same
year. This is a clear challenge for the use of satellite light data in time series. The
problem is most severe when comparing measurements from years with different
satellites. We are unable to say if the measure of for instance the satellite F15
(marked in purple in the figure below) in 2000 can be seen as a continuation of the
measurement of the satellite F12 (marked in red in the figure below) in 1999, see the
figure below. Alternatively the measurement of satellite F14 could be more correct.
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Figure A.1.: Light density at national level: uncalibrated
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To be able to do a proper analysis of the data I need to calibrate the satellites. To
answer the question of whether we can observe patronage over time, it is crucial to be
able use the whole data set as a time series. A calibration will make the data fit into
one time series, and will allow me to compare the light density over time. I have tried
different methods of calibration of the aggregated data. However, the calibration did
not smooth out the differences properly and I kept meeting challenges. Upon contact
with the producers of the data I got an “in house” calibration method from NOAA.
By this method, I calibrate each picture before aggregating the data. The result is
much more convincing than the methods I first used when calibrating the aggregated
data. The three different calibration methods that I developed are presented below.
The three strategies use one of the satellites that has measurements from two years
as a tool for inter calibration. It is more difficult to find a way to be able to compare
the data from 2009 and 2010, when there are no overlapping satellites.
Method I Method I gives a slightly smoother trend than without calibration, but
there are still many irregularities between what different satellites measure in a same
year.
The light density is calibrated based on the first year of each satellite running by
finding a relation number between the two measurements of one year and increasing
the following numbers by this relation number. Calibrating the satellite F12 on F10
in 1994 is done by dividing the number of light density in the whole country measured
by the satellite F12.1994 by the one from F10.1994. This gives the relation number
1.31, by which all numbers from F12 are multiplied with. For the other satellites I
have calibrated F14 on F12 in 1997 and multiplied all numbers from F14 by 1.71.
I have calibrated F15 on F14 in 2000 and multiplied all numbers from F15 by 1.31
and calibrated F16 on F15 in 2004, multiplied all numbers from F16 by 0.89. This
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method do not allow for calibration of F10 and F18, and gives the results presented
in the figure A.2.
GDP is included to show the different measure between the satellite light as a proxy
for economic development and the traditional measure of GDP. The period where
GDP is higher than light density can indicate that the economic growth does not
benefit the local population, at least not in terms of electricity for housing, road
lightning for security, hospitals, enterprises and so on. The period where the light
density is relatively higher than the GDP, compared to the inverse period, can give
indications that there was more economic activity in the population than what GDP
was able to measure. Another possibility is that the effects on light density and on
the welfare of the people after the liberalization of the economy by president Marc
Ravalomanana (2002-2009) are lagged.
Figure A.2.: Light density, calibrated with method I
Light density at national level: calibrated on the first year of the satellite running,
including GDP
Method II Since the satellites seem to give numbers that divert from the trend
the first year of running I have tried to calibrate them based on the second year
of the satellite running by using the same method as above. For instance, instead
of calibrating F14 on F12 in 1997 (the first year F14 is running), I calibrate in the
second year F14 is running, namely in 1998.
Calibrating F14 on F12 in 1998 is done by dividing the number of light density in
the whole country measured by F14.1998 by the one from F12.1998. This gives the
relation number 1.41 by which all numbers from F14 are multiplied with. For the
other satellites the numbers are: calibrate F15 on F14 in 2001: 1.21 and calibrate
F16 on F15 in 2004: 1.18. This method does not allow for calibration of F10,
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F12 and F18. The result shows much clearer trends when there are more satellites
measuring the same year that gives the same result, see figure A.3.
However, there are still some serious irregularities in what different satellites mea-
suring the same object in the same year report. I have therefore tried a third method
of calibration of the aggregated data.
Figure A.3.: Light density, calibrated with method II
Light density at national level: calibrated on the second year of the satellite running,
including GDP
Method III By doing a calibration on the average of difference between two satel-
lites, for years when there are two satellites, smooths out the variation between
different satellites better than the two previous calibration strategies. This method
gives the following calibration numbers: When calibrating F12 on F10 in 1994 -1661
is subtracted to the numbers of F12. When calibrating F14 on F12 on the average
from 1997 to 1999 -6944 is subtracted to the numbers of F14. When calibrating
F15 on F14 on the average from 2000 to 2003 -4532 is subtracted to the numbers
of F15. When calibrating F16 on F15 on the average from 2004 to 2007 -489,5 is
subtracted to the numbers of F16. F10 and F18 could not be calibrated when using
this method. The results are shown in figure A.4.
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Figure A.4.: Light density, calibrated with method III
Light density at national level: calibration on the average of difference between two
satellites for years when two satellites
If following up this method of calibration I would have chosen to use the satellites
that measure the highest amount of light each year (on national levels). The follow-
ing criteria: to use the ones that measure most light is a good choice, because we
get the most detailed information. One exception, as you see on the uncalibrated
data in figure 4.1, is 2004 where I would have chosen to use satellite F15 instead of
F16. The reason is that F16 gives a measure of density in 2004 that gives a high
jump relative to the trend. On the calibrated national data this jump is faded away,
which is a good reason for choosing F15 for 2004, so that the uncalibrated data has
the same trend slope as the calibrated. This would have led me to use the following
satellite data sets:
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Table A.1.: Satellites chosen for method I calibration
Year/Sat elites F10 F12 F14 F15 F16 F18
1992 F101992
1993 F101993
1994 F101994
1995 F121995
1996 F121996
1997 F121997
1998 F121998
1999 F121999
2000 F152000
2001 F152001
2002 F152002
2003 F142003
2004 F152004
2005 F162005
2006 F162006
2007 F162007
2008 F162008
2009 F162009
2010 F182010
By using this method, I would not have calibrated the satellite data on local levels.
The local levels are measured relative to the whole country, which means that it
also controls for satellite. One reason for calibrating on local levels could be if the
satellites are biased towards measuring more light in one region relative to what
they measure in the rest of the country. I assume that this is not the case. This
assumption implies that when controlling the levels of other satellites the relative
light in district A relative to the country will be equal for two satellites measuring
the same year. However, I do not apply this method further. Calibrating each and
every pixel of information gives more accurate calibration, which is presented under
Method IV.
Method IV Despite of improving the calibration method used above, I kept search-
ing for better methods of calibration to get more accurate estimates of patronage .
Upon contact with the US Earth Observation Group NOAA National Geophysical
Data Center, who are producing the satellite data, I got the chance to use their most
recent “in house” calibration for stable light data that they kindly shared with me.
This method is much better than the ones above as it calibrates each value number
of light density instead of calibrating the aggregate numbers for any administrative
level. The calibration for the stable light data is based on the method published
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in Elvidge et al. (2009) on the average light. “The objective of the inter calibra-
tion is to make it possible to pool the sum of lights index values from each year of
the time series” (Elvidge et al., 2009, p.601). The article further describes that the
satellites do not have any on-board calibration. Each composite was inter calibrated
via an empirical procedure. Several lighting from cities was examined to find the
best “baseline”. Data from satellite F12 in 1999 had the highest digital values. Of
all the areas examined Sicily had the most favorable characteristics. Light density
from Sicily on the satellite F12.1999 was used as the reference and the data from all
other satellite years were adjusted to match the F12.1999 data range. A second or-
der regression model was developed for each satellite year for inter calibration. The
second order regressing model for each satellite and each year used in the calibration
of the data in the thesis is found in the attachment. To calibrate the data I used the
tool “Raster Calculator” in “Map Algebra, Spatial Analyst Tools” in ArcMAP 10
calibrating each raster picture separately. I use the mathematical equation and set
in the whole picture in the equation. ArcMAP calculates the new values for each
pixel and form a new calibrated picture.
This calibration calibrates all values of light and therefore gives calibrated values
for all administrative levels as well. The figure below presents all calibrated satellite
lights on the national level. As you see in figure 4.3 this calibration gives another
point of view for the analysis. This method gives a more correct picture of economic
activity in Madagascar. However, it is worth to notice that the value for 2010 is from
a new satellite (F18) and might not give a true picture despite being calibrated. The
reason to question the satellite is that 2010 is the only year from which we have an
observation by this satellite and it deviates from the previous trend by a reduction
of nearly 50%.
Figure A.5.: Light density at national level: calibrated
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Apart from the analysis of 2010, all the local analysis in the thesis are from the same
satellites when looking at differences from years to others.
For the development from 2009 to 2010, where there is no overlap in satellites,
the relative data is more reliable as it measures the relative level of activity in a
region relative to the whole country. Everything else equal this shall be the same as
previous years even if we look at a different satellite.
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B.1. Three administrative levels
Table B.1.: The presidents and their period of presidency at three administrative
levels.
President Period adm1 adm2 adm3
Didier Ratsiraka June 1975-March 1993 Toamasina Toamasina Vatomandry*
Zafy Albert March1993-Sept.1996 Antsiranana Diana Ambilobe
Norbert Ratsirahonana Sept.1996-Feb.1997 Antsiranana Diana Antsiranana
Didier Ratsiraka Feb.1997-July 2002 Toamasina Toamasina Vatomandry*
Mark Ravalomanana Feb.2002-March 2009 Antananarivo Analamanga Antananarivo N.
Andry Rajoelina March 2002- Antananarivo Analamanga Antananarivo N.
adm1: Autonomous Province (Faritany Mizakatena)
adm2: Region (Faritra)
adm3: District (Fivondronana)
*Using "Toamasina Rural" instead in the analysis since Ratsiraka is closer linked
to the urban district of "Toamasina Rural" than to the neighboring rural district of
"Vatomandry".
B.2. Results on the administrative levels of province
and of district
In the following only the relative results representations of the results are included.
It must therefore be read in relation to the presentation of results and the analysis
in chapter 5.
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Figure B.1.: Light density in the Province of Toamasina
President Didier Ratsirakas home province: trends in light density relative to the
whole country. The periods in the two first circles are the periods when he was in
power. The period when Rajoelina governs is included in the last circle.
Toamasina:
Figure B.2.: Light density in the District of Toamasina
President Didier Ratsirakas home district: trends in light density relative to the
whole country. The periods in the two first circles are the periods when he was in
power. The period when Rajoelina governs is included in the last circle.
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The North
Figure B.3.: Light density in the Province of Diana
President Zafy Albert and President Norbert Ratsirahonana’s home province: trends
in light density relative to the whole country. The circle indicates the period Al-
bert and Ratisrahonana governed. Albert from March 1993 to September 1996 and
Ratsirahonana from September 1996 to February 1997.
Figure B.5.: Light density in the District of Antsiranana
President Norbert Ratsirahonanas home district: trends in light density relative to
the whole country.
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Figure B.4.: Light density in the District of Diana
President Zafy Alberts home district: trends in light density relative to the whole
country.
The capital Antananarivo
Figure B.6.: Light density in the Province of Antananarivo
President Marc Ravalomanana and Transitional President Andry Rajoelinas home
province: trends in light density relative to the whole country. The circles indicates
the periods Ravalomanana and Rajoelina governed. Ravalomanana from February
2002 to March 2009 (he was reelected in 2006) and Rajoelina from March 2009. New
elections are due in mid 2013.
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Figure B.7.: Light density in the District of Antananarivo Nord
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